Most contracts, whether between voters and politicians or between house owners and contractors, are incomplete. "More law," it typically is assumed, increases the likelihood of contract performance by increasing the probability of enforcement and/or the cost of breach. This paper studies a contractual relationship where the …rst mover has to decide whether she wants to enter a contract without knowing whether the second mover will perform. We analyze how contract enforceability a¤ects individual performance for exogenous preferences. Then we apply a dynamic model of preference adaptation and …nd that economic incentives have a non-monotonic impact on behavior. Individuals perform a contract when enforcement is strong or weak but not with medium enforcement probabilities: Trustworthiness is "crowded in" with weak and "crowded out" with medium enforcement. In a laboratory experiment we test our model's implications and …nd support for the crowding prediction. Our …nding is in line with the recent work on the role of contract enforcement and trust in formerly Communist countries.
Introduction
Trust can increase e¢ciency in the economic and the political spheres. Recent studies using aggregate data have suggested the existence of an e¢ciency-enhancing feature of trust for countries and organizations. 1 This paper attempts at providing a microfoundation for some of these …ndings. It investigates whether trustworthiness can have an economic payo¤ at the individual level. Important domains for trust and trustworthiness include the relationship between representatives and their constituents, such as between politicians and voters, managers and shareholders or attorneys and clients. In all these situations, principals have to decide whether they want to enter a contract with an agent, knowing that the contract will be incomplete. O¤ering a contract, thus, is a matter of trust, and performing it, a matter of trustworthiness.
The problem of trust is more pronounced in large, anonymous societies than in small groups where participants frequently interact. In the latter case, reputation matters and folk theorem-like arguments can sustain cooperation even in the absence of genuine trustworthiness. In the former case, similar arguments tend to fail, creating the need for institutions, such as the law, to facilitate e¢cient outcomes. 2 The law, however, may a¤ect behavior not only by creating incentives but also by in ‡uencing preferences. Rational choice theory has focused on the …rst aspect. In this paper, we propose a model integrating both e¤ects. We analyze how the enforceability of a contract a¤ects individual performance in the short run 1 See, for example, Putnam (1993) , Fukuyama (1995) , La Porta et al. (1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997) . 2 See, for example, Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990) and Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast (1994) . For a proof of the folk theorem in the prisoner's dilemma with large groups and anonymous interaction, see Ellison (1994) . The behavioral relevance of repetition and anonymity have been studied in many laboratory experiments, see, for example, Andreoni (1988) and Bohnet and Frey (1999) . For a survey, see Ostrom (1998) who also discusses how experimental results relate to political science.
with given preferences and in the long run when preferences adapt to the new environment.
Our analysis builds on an evolutionary approach. 3 We present analytical results and test their implications in a laboratory experiment.
A contractual relationship is represented by a game in which the …rst mover has to decide whether she wants to enter a contract without knowing whether the second mover will perform. If the second mover breaches, a chance move decides whether he is held liable for the cost of breach. Standard economic analysis of law predicts that the higher the expected cost of breach is, the more likely second movers are to perform. We show that, when preferences are subject to change, this need not be the case. More speci…cally, we …nd that the probability with which a contract is enforced has a non-monotonic impact on behavior: Second movers' performance rates are not only high when the expected cost of breach is su¢ciently large but also when it is su¢ciently small.
We focus on preferences for contract performance and assume that individuals may experience psychological costs when breaching a contract. Such trustworthy individuals are said to have a preference for honesty. 4 Based on the idea that a speci…c preference is more likely to be maintained and to ‡ourish if it proves to be economically successful, we study a dynamic process in which preferences can change over time. Legal rules can "crowd in" as well as "crowd out" preferences. We …nd that intermediate levels of contract enforcement lead to crowding out while low levels induce crowding in. The intuition for this is rather straightforward. Suppose you are a …rst mover who has to decide whether to enter a contract.
If you know that the legal system is ine¢cient, i.e., that contracts are rarely enforced, you will be extremely cautious. Clearly, you would like to enter if you knew your partner was trustworthy. If you received a signal about your partner's trustworthiness, you would only enter if the signal was "su¢ciently good." This caution protects you from being exploited too often as well as making trustworthy second movers more successful than others, because on average, they will get more contracts than others. Hence, honesty will be crowded in.
Contractual relationships with weak enforcement are typical for many organizational settings. Some …rms purposely create a low enforcement environment where interactions are not guided by the expected cost of breach but by intrinsic motivation. At the same time, these …rms heavily invest in screening of potential future employees, stressing that character is more important than the possession of speci…c skills. 5 Similarly, most micro-…nance institutions (e.g. Grameen Bank or Accion) lending money to poor clients without physical collateral, focus on "character-based lending". In the absence of external enforcement mechanisms, the intrinsic trustworthiness of their clients is one of the key variables making a contract between borrowers and lenders possible (Murdoch 1999) .
The same pattern applies to many other domains: The more leeway agents have -whether these are employees, borrowers, legislators, judges or executives -the more careful principals are when deciding whom to o¤er a contract. That the leeway for politicians can be considerable becomes clear in Rose-Ackerman's (1999) analysis of corruption. She points out that (not even) in the United States the law is strict enough to deter elected o¢cials from being corrupt. "The criminal penalties are 'not more than three times the monetary equivalent of the thing in value (i.e. the bribe) or imprisonment for not more than …fteen years, or both' (18 USC § 201 (a) ). This is appropriate for o¢cials who receive bribes except that multiplying by three may be a poor measure of the risk of detection and punishment. The actual probability of catch is likely to be well below one-third." (p. 55) Whether this probability is low in enough to induce crowding-in is an empirical question. If the probability of contract enforcement is higher but not high enough to deter all second movers from breaching, we expect crowding-out.
With such medium enforcement, the expected payo¤ of entering is higher than the payo¤ of abstaining even if you know that the contract will be breached. Accordingly, you will enter regardless of your beliefs about your partner's trustworthiness. This unconditional trust makes expected monetary payo¤-maximizing second movers more successful than honest types who forsake pro…table opportunities to breach. Therefore, honesty will be crowded out causing the aforesaid non-monotonicity: With high levels of contract enforceability, all second movers perform because they are deterred regardless of their preferences, and all …rst movers enter the contract; preferences are irrelevant and outcomes are e¢cient. With intermediate levels, honesty is crowded out; more second movers breach and resources are wasted in trials. With low levels, trustworthiness is crowded in; more second movers perform even though they would have an incentive to breach without a preference for honesty and e¢ciency increases.
Contract enforcement probabilities which are too small to deter breach may be due to a badly functioning legal system with weak state protection, corrupt governments and judicia-ries, or high enforcement costs. So far, it has mainly been discussed how informal institutions, such as social norms, may substitute for an ine¤ective legal system, and whether shame and ostracism can replace imprisonment and …nes. 6 Our model focuses on formal law and intrinsic dispositions and shows how the e¤ectiveness of the two motivational factors depends on each other. By providing a speci…c legal enforcement regime, the state a¤ects the degree of trust and trustworthiness in a society. Including formal institutions into the analysis of trust and trustworthiness addresses an aspect so far little touched in the current debate on trust and social capital. 7 Our …ndings may help understand two tendencies currently observed in many countries of the former Soviet bloc: On the one hand, there is a demand for "more law" in order to enforce contracts and to secure property rights. As the state is unable to provide levels of enforcement high enough to deter breach, the demand for protection is satis…ed privately. This is one of the explanations for the rise of the Ma…a in Sicily (Gambetta 1993 ) and may also account for its thriving in Russia (Varese 1994) . On the other hand, a reemergence of the demand for and supply of trust-based relationships can be observed in the very same countries. In his chapter on "Economics of ethnic capital formation and con ‡ict, " Wintrobe (1995: 46-47) writes: "The absence of enforceability generates a demand for trust. The costs of trust formation are lower, when the two parties share common traits, such as a common language, ethnicity, and so on." While his analysis is di¤erent from ours, his conclusions 6 Social norms have been shown to con…ne minor crimes such as trespassing (Ellickson 1991) or the overuse of common pool resources (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994) . For the legal debate about "alternative sanctions" see Kahan (1996) and for a general discussion of how social norms and the law interact Sunstein (1996) and Cooter (1998) . 7 See Tarrow (1996: 395) who asks: "Can we be satis…ed interpreting civic capacity as a home-grown product in which the state has played no role?" Schneider et al. (1997) are among the few who discuss the in ‡uence of institutions, namely of the extent parents can choose a public school, on social capital. Those interested in the in ‡uence of institutions mainly focus on the relationship between institutions and trust rather than between institutions and trustworthiness (see, e.g., Brehm and Rahn 1997 , Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997 and Norris 1999 are similar: More order can be achieved by relying on trust-based relationships where the parties are able to predict each other's likelihood of cooperation.
Our analysis provides a possible rationale for the coexistence of these two tendencies.
People cannot help asking for "more law" if trustworthiness has been crowded out. On the other hand, if it has been crowded in, people can rely on trust-based interactions. Simis (1982) and Varese (1994) suggest that the former Soviet system was characterized by corruption rather than organized crime a¤ecting only speci…c sections of the population, namely the "nomenclatura." It is these groups who in the absence of a credible state are unable to engage in trust-based interactions and thus, demand private protection. On the other hand, for ordinary people, trust was and still is the basis of their contractual relationships (Wintrobe 1995) . Overall, our model predicts a pattern also described by a Latin American quip: "A los amigos todo, a los enimigos nada, al extrano la ley." (For friends everything, for enemies nothing, for the stranger the law.) 8 The model's empirical validity is tested in the laboratory where we implement the theoretical setup as closely as possible. The experimental results support the crowding predictions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we …rst study how agents behave with …xed preferences, then analyze the crowding dynamics and discuss the model's main implications. Section 3 presents the design and the experimental results. Section 4 concludes. 8 We found this proverb in Rose-Ackerman (1999, p.97).
Theory

The contract game
We model a situation in which two players have the opportunity to produce a joint surplus.
There is, however, an asymmetry between the players. Player 1 has to enter the contract without knowing whether player 2 will perform. Therefore, player 1's decision whether to enter the contract is a matter of trust. 9 We denote her trusting move with T and her non-trusting move with T . In the case where she trusts, player 2 can perform (move P ) or breach (P ). The game ends if either player 1 does not enter, which yields zero-payo¤s for both parties, or if player 1's trust is rewarded by player 2's cooperation. This yields payo¤s of 1 for both players. 10 In case of breach, we assume that there is a …nal chance move capturing a litigation process. With probability p player 2 will be held liable (move L). The surplus is divided as in the case of performance but player 2 has to bear the costs of the trial c > 0, i.e. we assume that perfect expectation damages place the trusting party in the position it would have been in if the other party had performed and that all legal fees are paid by the losing party. 11 Thus, the payo¤s are 1 for player 1 and 1 ¡ c for player 2. If player 2 is not held liable (L) he pro…ts from breach and receives a payo¤ of 1+b (with b > 0) while player 1 su¤ers a loss. Her payo¤ is ¡a with a¸c as she bears the legal cost and is not compensated for any investments she made by entering the contract. Breach is never e¢cient. The bene…ts from breach are not large enough to compensate the …rst mover, i.e., b < 1 + a. Figure 1 shows this game in its extensive form.
We assume that all payo¤s are monetary. However, in order to solve the game we need utilities associated with the various outcomes. To map outcomes into (cardinal) utilities we assume that there are two possible preferences a player can have, i.e., players can be of two di¤erent types. One type (M ) is only interested in (expected) monetary payo¤s. This means that for this type the monetary payo¤s in Figure 1 represent utilities. The second type (H) is assumed to have a preference for honesty. In particular, we assume that this type su¤ers from psychological costs when breaching a contract. These costs are assumed to be su¢ciently high such that a player of type H would never betray regardless of the monetary gain b. 12 12 This assumption simpli…es the analysis without altering its results. All results would still hold if we allowed for a larger set of preferences incorporating di¤erent levels of psychological costs. Notice that in the case of a continuous type space-possibly ranging from in…nite (psychological) costs to in…nite gains-all that Having introduced the set of possible preferences fM; Hg we can transform the 'money game' of Figure 1 into a standard game where the payo¤s are von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities. This is done by replacing the payo¤ of player 2 after path T P L by 1 + b ¡ ± where ± = 0 for type M and ± > b for type H.
Assuming that player 1 recognizes which type player 2 is, we have, for each possible match of players, a well-speci…ed standard game. 13 We solve this game by backward induction. 14 Obviously, player 2 will breach if his expected payo¤ from breach exceeds 1, i.e. if
As assumed, for type H this is never ful…lled. A player 2 with a preference for honesty will always choose P . For type M, we can insert ± = 0 into inequality 1 and rewrite it as
Next, we can focus on the decision of player 1. If she is confronted with an H-type she will surely trust. The same is true if she is confronted with an M -type and p > b b+c holds. But if she is confronted with an M-type and (2) is ful…lled she will enter only if her expected payo¤ from entering exceeds her outside-option payo¤, i.e., if p ¡ a(1 ¡ p) > 0. This can be rearranged as
matters is whether the costs are larger or smaller than the monetary gain b.
From this follows
Proposition 1 In what follows we shall assume that ac < b. Otherwise (T; P ) would never be an SPE and the crowding analysis would be less rich and less interesting. Imposing this requirement means, informally speaking, that the loss player 1 incurs after having been betrayed and not compensated must be relatively small in comparison to the pro…t of player 2 and the legal costs.
Crowding
The previous subsection showed how individuals with given preferences behave under di¤er-ent legal regimes. We now allow for preferences to adapt to the contractual situation and study the implications of "preference crowding" for our model. Economically successful preferences are crowded in, unsuccessful preferences are crowded out. Formally, this means that the share of types with a certain preference grows faster than another share, if and only if the average material earnings of the former exceed the average earnings of the latter. In the context of our model and in the absence of a fully ‡edged theory of preference formation, this assumption seems natural. Contracts are closed to secure material bene…ts and the outcomes of our contract game are exclusively characterized by di¤erent resource allocations. 15 The assumption that successful "traits" spread is often associated with models of genetic evolution, although it can be justi…ed di¤erently. 16 One justi…cation is o¤ered in Appendix A which brie ‡y illustrates a stochastic model of individual preference adaptation. 17 In our model, this implies the following: If honesty leads to forsaking pro…table opportunities such that a typical H-type earns less than a typical M-type, honesty will be crowded out. On the other hand, honesty will be crowded in if individuals are in an environment favoring honesty such that, on average, H-types earn more than M-types.
In order to calculate how successful the two di¤erent types (of preferences) are, we assume that individuals are randomly matched to play the contract game, and that there are enough individuals such that the law of large numbers can be applied. This allows us to take expected values as a measure of success.
Proposition 1 shows that what happens when two players interact depends on the value
of p, the probability that the contract is enforced. As indicated in the proposition we can distinguish three regimes. For each regime we can now study how preferences are crowded in and out.
In this case, all individuals, regardless of type and matching, will play the SPE (T; P ).
This means that individuals of both types receive the same expected monetary payo¤. Thus, there will not be any crowding and regardless of the numbers of H-and M-types, the large enforcement probability ensures performance.
With medium p, behavior in a match depends on the type of player 2. If player 2 is of type H, the SPE is (T; P ). If he is of type M, the SPE is (T; P ). Since M maximizes expected monetary payo¤s while H does not, it follows that average earnings of M-types exceed average earnings of H-types. In the role of player 2, M -types earn on average
, which is strictly greater than 1, the payo¤ of an H-type in the role of player 2. When in the role of player 1, M-types and H-types do equally well on average, since the expected payo¤ of a player 1 is independent of her own type. Thus, with medium p, M-types always earn more than H-types (regardless of the current number of them). Accordingly, honest preferences will be crowded out. This implies, asymptotically for the long run, that H-types will completely vanish and that all individuals will play equilibrium (T; P ).
We proceed as in the above case, but now take into account that (T ; P ) is the SPE if player 2 is of type M and that (T; P ) is the SPE if player 2 is of type H. In this case, the earnings of H-types exceed the earnings of M-types. When in the role of player 2, the former always receive 1, the latter always 0. When in the role of player 1, the average payo¤s of the two types are again identical. They do not depend on their own type. Thus, with low p, preferences for honesty are crowded in and, in the long run, type M will vanish such that all individuals will play the trust-rewarding equilibrium (T; P ).
We summarize our results in
Proposition 2 In the case where there is no crowding; in the long run both types may be present in the society and all individuals play (T; P ); a 1+a < p < b b+c trustworthiness is crowded out; in the long run only type M will be present in the society and all individuals play (T; P ); p < a 1+a trustworthiness is crowded in; in the long run only type H will be present in the society and all individuals play (T; P ).
The long-run stable states can also be derived by analyzing evolutionary games in which the two types compete. For p > b b+c this game is trivial as both types behave identically and receive identical payo¤s. For the other cases the two matrix games in Tables 1 and 2 emerge.
(Note that the payo¤s are based on the assumption that both types are equally likely to become player 1 or 2.) As p < b b+c , it is easy to see that the game has a unique evolutionarily stable strategy (see Maynard Smith 1982) . There is a unique equilibrium (M; M) and the equilibrium strict. Hence, the unique evolutionarily stable strategy is M. This mirrors the second result of Proposition 2: In the long run only M-types survive.
An even simpler matrix emerges in case of p < a 1+a . Clearly, the unique equilibrium of this game is (H; H) and as the equilibrium is strict, the unique evolutionarily stable strategy is H. This mirrors the third result of Proposition 2.
Discussion
There are two main implications of Proposition 2. The most fundamental one is that it is impossible to predict behavior in a group of agents playing the contract game without knowing their history. Individuals' preferences are subject to change, and outcomes in one round a¤ect the distribution of types in the next. And, since individuals' preferences depend on past regimes, so do their actions. The longer a group of agents has played in a lowprobability environment, the more individuals with a preference for honesty are present and the less breach is observed. Vice-versa for a medium-p environment. Also it may be possible that groups have experienced regime changes in the past in which case one does not only need to know how long the group has been playing under the current regime, but also how long under the preceding one. The total crowding history matters.
The second signi…cant implication of the proposition is that the probability of contract enforcement exerts a non-monotonic e¤ect on behavior. Such a non-monotonicity would not occur in standard models with …xed preferences. 18 The worst legal regime is not one where contracts cannot be enforced but one with an intermediate level of contract enforceability.
With an intermediate p there is no need for …rst movers to care about with whom they interact, since entering the contract is better than staying with the outside option, even if the contract is breached. This lack of caution makes those who are dishonest economically successful. Accordingly, the share of dishonest types will grow. This is the situation which gave the present study its title: There are two alternatives-"more order with more law" or "more order with less law".
With less law, …rst movers have to be extremely cautious. They have to think about their partners' trustworthiness which makes honesty a successful preference. In our model, …rst movers receive a perfect signal about their opponents' type and their decision rule is simple: "Only enter a contract if your opponent is trustworthy." With a stochastic signal the rule would be very similar: "Only enter if the signal is good enough." This illustrates how our results would extend to the more general case of imperfect but informative signals.
With perfect signals, M-types in the role of player 2 are never o¤ered contracts when p is low while H -types always get contracts. With imperfect signals, some M-types would get contracts while some H-types would not (namely whenever the signal is wrong). However, if the signal is su¢ciently informative H-types will get more contracts than M-types which is required for crowding in. Appendix B elaborates on the case of imperfect signals further.
Comparing the two alternative policies for replacing a medium probability regime ("more or less law"), two di¤erences can be observed. The …rst one is due to the dynamic nature of our analysis. With "more law", more order is instantaneously achieved since performance becomes rational for everybody and so does entering. This is di¤erent in the case of "less law" because after the change of the regime the crowding process needs some time. Though our experimental results below indicate that adjustments can be pretty fast in small groups, the behavior does not change instantaneously. This is an argument in favor of the standard law-and-order approach. However, "less law" is less costly. In our model, we disregard all …xed costs of legal contract enforcement and also variable costs being a function of p.
Increasing p costs resources. Decreasing p saves resources.
Here we do not wish to make any judgement about what is the better policy. Instead we test our model's empirical validity in the laboratory.
Experiment
Design
The experimental design tries to implement our model as closely as possible. Subjects participated in a 2-person contract game and were randomly matched. Six sessions with altogether 154 subjects were conducted and the game was repeated several times. Focussing on crowding in ("more order with less law"), subjects in all sessions were confronted with a low contract enforcement probability during the last rounds. In order to create di¤erent histories, the legal regime in the …rst few rounds was varied. If behavior was driven by incentives only, behavior should be independent of the history created in earlier rounds and should only depend on the current legal regime. If preferences adapt to the legal regime, on the other hand, the history of earlier rounds should also a¤ect the likelihood of performance in later rounds.
Experimental subjects were confronted with identical payo¤ tables and the payo¤s were ² 50 cents for each player whenever the …rst mover chose T ; ² 150 cents for each player in case of T P ; ² 150 cents for the …rst and 120 cents for the second mover in case of T P L; ² 20 cents for the …rst and 250 cents for the second mover in case of T P L.
Thus, the normalized payo¤ variables were a = :3, b = 1, and c = :3. The probabilities were :1, : 5, and :9. 19 Subjects received payments for each round. Instructions (see Appendix C) were neutrally framed. After each round, aggregate information on outcomes was provided, i.e. …rst and second movers knew how many contracts were o¤ered and performed in the previous round.
Providing information on the distribution of types only serves as a conservative test of our model, as individuals' types could not perfectly be detected. As the crowding model assumes random matching, we implemented a stranger treatment in …ve sessions and used a …xed-pair matching in one control session. Table 3 presents an overview of all sessions.
The experiments were conducted at two di¤erent universities (labelled B and H). 20 Participation was voluntary; interested students could sign up for an experimental session Subjects were identi…ed by code numbers only and anonymity was fully preserved. After having signed a consent form, participants were randomly assigned to the roles of …rst and second mover and given a written instruction and an envelope containing a code number sheet and nine decision sheets, all marked with the subject's code number. Instructions were repeated orally, allowing subjects to ask questions and to control that everybody faced the same decision task. In all but session 4, they were truthfully assured that they would be randomly matched with a di¤erent person after each round. They were told that nine rounds would be played and that they would publicly be informed on the aggregate outcome after 19 Subjects carried out the chance moves themselves. After each round a randomly chosen participant picked a card from a pile of red and black cards.
Session Matching
Prob. 
Results
Our theory predicts history-dependent behavior. The longer individuals are confronted with a low-p environment, the more trustworthiness should be crowded in, and the higher performance rates should be. High enforcement probabilities are expected to be crowding-neutral, while trustworthiness should be crowded out with medium probabilities. 22 Appendix D presents the results for all sessions in all rounds. First, we brie ‡y examine session 4 with …xed pairs. This is a simple control session as the requirements for crowding are not ful…lled. There is no random matching and therefore no interaction on the group level. Instead, subjects play a …nitely repeated game. Experiments on other games with cooperative gains (e.g., repeated public goods games or gift exchange games) reveal that with this kind of matching, cooperation rates are typically higher than standard theory expects. Furthermore, cooperation rates seem to be relatively stable over time, but break 21 The instructions neither told them that the environment would remain constant nor that it would change. 22 However, these predictions cannot be viewed as deterministic since the law of large numbers does not apply in the lab (see also Appendix A).
down towards the end of the game when the "shadow of the future" loses its power and reputation no longer plays a role. This strong drop in the last rounds has been called an "end game e¤ect" (Selten and Stoecker 1983) . 23 If the contract game is comparable to these games, we should observe a similar pattern. Inspection of Appendix D con…rms this expectation: We …nd that in the …xed-pairs session cooperation drops from 100% to 0% in the last round.
In contrast, our crowding theory predicts increasing cooperation over time and rules out an end-game e¤ect. After all, it predicts that trustworthy second movers perform because they receive less utility from breaching than from performing, even though breaching leads to a higher monetary payo¤. Table 4 shows aggregate data for rounds 4 to 9 in all randommatching sessions. It suggests that there is a trend towards more cooperation which does not break down. On the contrary, the performance rate (the number of contracts performed divided by the number of contracts o¤ered) reaches its maximum in the last round which is in line with the crowding prediction. We summarize by
Result 1 In the low-probability environment with random matching, performance rates increase over time and there is no end-game e¤ect.
Our model assumes that it is most e¢cient if all second movers perform. We expect high e¢ciency rates instantaneously when enforcement is strong, and only slow increases in e¢ciency rates over time with low enforcement probabilities. Figure 2 run, high enforcement probabilities lead to the most e¢cient outcomes. In the medium term, when the crowding dynamics start to become relevant, the low-p environment is most e¢cient. The longer subjects have been confronted with a low-p environment, the less the di¤erential e¤ects of their respective crowding histories apply.
Result 2 In the short run, e¢ciency rates are highest when enforcement is strong; in the medium term, they are highest in the low-probability environment; in the long run, the di¤erential e¤ects of enforcement and crowding tend to vanish.
In order to analyze the data more thoroughly, we next estimate binary choice models for …rst movers' propensity to enter and second movers' propensity to perform, and control for the relevance of crowding compared to economic incentives and for university …xed e¤ects.
In order to measure crowding let°t
1 if p is small in group j in round t 0 if p is high in group j in round t ¡1 if p is medium in group j in round t and let
The variable°t j indicates whether our theory predicts crowding in (+1), crowding out (¡1), or no crowding (0) and the variable CROW D t j summarizes the "crowding history" of group j up to round t. If the theory is relevant we would expect that CROW D t j helps explain the propensity of second movers to perform. 24 Besides CROW D we also include the following variables as covariates: ² UNIV j -a dummy variable indicating the university group j belonged to; UNIV j = 1
for H and UNIV j = 0 for B.
Furthermore, we also run (logistic) regressions including subject dummies S ji . 25 The estimated model without subject dummies is
with q t rji indicating either …rst mover i's propensity to enter or second mover i's to perform. Table 5 presents the results for …rst movers' decisions, Table 6 for second movers' decisions.
All sessions with random matching are included.
We …nd that …rst movers' behavior is mainly driven by the economic incentives they face and by the performance rate of the last round. In the estimation without subject dummies Table 6 : Logistic regression for second movers' propensity to perform (312 observations). R is the partial contribution measuring the relative importance of each variable.
we also …nd a signi…cant e¤ect of the university dummy: on average, H students enter less often than B students. Since the university dummy loses its signi…cance when subject dummies are introduced we are con…dent that the di¤erence between H and B is not due to some di¤erences in the experimental procedures (of which we were not aware). Rather, the di¤erence is on the individual level.
The same is true for second movers where we …nd that H students are more trustworthy than B students. Again, this e¤ect disappears when we control for di¤erences between individuals. In the estimation without subject dummies we …nd three additional variables which help explain second movers' decisions: economic incentives (less breaching if breach is deterred), last round's performance rate (such that there is some inertia), and …nally, the variable capturing the crowding history of groups (the longer subjects interacted in a low-p environment, the more likely they are to be trustworthy). The latter variable is the only one which remains signi…cant when we include subject dummies. We summarize by
Result 3 First movers' propensity to enter mainly depends on their monetary incentives and on second movers' previous performance rate. Second movers' propensity to perform mainly depends on their crowding history.
The second part of Result 3 is the key result of this study as it con…rms the qualitative predictions of the crowding theory. It is, however, a result on the aggregate level, and it seems worthwhile to investigate whether the theory also predicts individual behavior well. The main prediction of our model on the individual level is that in the low-p environment, subjects who have breached contracts once are much more likely to switch to honest behavior than Table 7 : Individual behavior in the low-probability environment.
switch from breaching to performing once p is low. Additionally, we count how many second movers switch in unpredicted directions and how many never switch once p is low. Table   7 presents the results. The picture is clear: 53.6% of all subjects changed their behavior in the low-probability environment. And of these, 89.2% switched in the direction which is predicted. In other words, 33 second movers breached in the early phases of the experiment and then performed later, even though the money-maximizing strategy would have been to stick to the old behavior. None of these 33 subjects switched back to breaching. They became trustworthy, even though they started by breaching. On the other hand, there are only very few unpredicted switches. 26 The null-hypothesis that the switching of behavior is random can be rejected at a signi…cance level of .01%. Thus, the crowding theory's predictions are also con…rmed by analyzing individual data.
Conclusion
We have studied a model where the (legal) rules of a game do not only have short-run but also long-run e¤ects on behavior because they a¤ect preferences. In a contractual relationship, economic incentives have a non-monotonic impact on contract performance. Our theoretical model complements recent approaches studying how rules and preferences interact (see, for 26 Notice that, as the theory is stochastic, these instances are not entirely unpredicted.
example, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) as the latter only allow for di¤erences in preferences but not for preferences to change. Our model suggests that the rules of the game determine which preferences dominate. More speci…cally, it predicts that low levels of legal contract enforcement crowd in trustworthiness. As …rst movers cannot trust the legal system, they only enter a contract if they can trust the second movers. They are careful when deciding whether to enter a contract, thus making trustworthiness a successful trait.
Arguing from a di¤erent perspective, others come to very similar conclusions. Mansbridge (1999), e.g., discusses various ways of encouraging trustworthiness and trust and concludes:
"When the trustworthiness of a population is too low to sustain a general stance of initial trust, and when geographic and social mobility make reputational, kin and local sanctions less viable, the trustworthy members of a given population will bene…t from …nding ways of distinguishing themselves and other trustworthy individuals from the untrustworthy (...) the trustworthy would …nd it useful to train themselves to recognize subtle signs of trustworthiness in others and also to develop in themselves signs that could not easily be mimicked." (p.
305). Di¤erences in incentives to learn about others' dispositions may account for some of the cross-cultural di¤erences in behavior found in laboratory experiments. Yamagishi, Cook, and Watanabe (1998) , e.g., argue that Japanese are less are less trusting and less trustworthy than American subjects because contract enforcement mechanisms and assurance structures are more prevalent in Japan than in the United States.
With high levels of contract enforcement, when contracts are completely speci…ed, interpersonal trust is replaced by institutional trust in the legal system. First movers enter a contract because second movers are deterred from breaching.
While previous work on crowding focused on the relevance of preferences when contracts are complete, 27 we show that it is not the complete contract which crowds out trustworthiness but the semi-speci…ed contract. With intermediate levels of contract enforcement, second movers are not yet deterred from breaching, and for …rst movers entering is …nancially more attractive than the outside option. Interpersonal trust is replaced by institutional trust in the legal system and genuine trustworthiness is crowded out. Such semi-speci…ed contracts cause a non-monotonicity of behavior: More order can result from less law, yielding a "motivation-compatible" environment (Bohnet and Frey 1997) , as well as from more law yielding an incentive-compatible environment.
Closely related to this …nding are results by Huang and Wu (1994) and Huck (1998) .
Using psychological game theory 28 and modeling games very similar to ours, Huang and Wu (1994) show that if players' payo¤s also depend on beliefs, di¤erent levels of order may result from the same level of law; i.e., there is a multiplicity of equilibria. Simply speaking, there is one equilibrium in which everybody believes that the society is well-functioning and that trust is rewarded, and this becomes self-ful…lling. If everybody believes the opposite is true, then it also becomes self-ful…lling. A crucial di¤erence between Huang and Wu's approach and ours is that preferences (over payo¤s and beliefs) are …xed in their model.
Thus, there are also no obvious dynamics leading from one state to another and there is no straightforward link between institutional design and behavior. This is di¤erent in Huck 27 See for policy examples, the early research by Titmuss (1970 ), Frey (1997 for the crowding out of tax morale, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) for the crowding out of civic duty in a siting context and Gneezy and Rustichini (1999) in every day life. For experimental evidence, see the extensive survey of studies in psychology by Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999) as well Falk, Gächter and Kovacs (1999) . For the disruption of "implicit agreements" in the organizational context, see Arrow (1974) . 28 See Geneakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1989) .
(1998) who shows in the context of criminal law that if preferences are allowed to change, socially desirable behavior can be induced with lower levels of (monetary) punishments than one would conclude assuming …xed preferences.
The implications of our model were tested in an experiment in which we tried to map the theoretical assumptions into a laboratory environment as precisely as possible. The results support our qualitative predictions. If there is enough time for the crowding dynamics to unfold, low enforcement-probability environments can produce outcomes as e¢cient as high levels of contract enforcement.
To the best of our knowledge, our results provide the …rst empirical evidence for longrun e¤ects of legal rules on behavior. While experiments simplify reality, we tried to weaken the trade-o¤ between external and internal validity as much as we could. Our design of the contract game is informed by real life institutions and represents a situation where legal enforcement leads to perfect expectation damages, and transaction costs are allocated according to the English rule. The "long run" in our experiment is nine rounds (or 45 minutes) which we interpret as a conservative test of crowding. In fact, we were surprised that the crowding dynamics unfolded as quickly and that our subjects' inclination to trust and to be trustworthy changed in such a short time span. Our experimental results, thus, support the institutionalists' view that institutional changes a¤ect behavior. However, the paper tried to show that, by a¤ecting behavior, institutions also a¤ect preferences. Assumption 1 (conformity) Ceteris paribus, q(! 0 ; ! 00 ) is proportional to f(! 00 ) .
The widely used replicator dynamics belong to the class of growth-monotonic evolutionary processes and it is easy to see when a process of individual preference adaptation behaves like the replicator dynamics.
f(! 00 ) the process of individual preference adaptation behaves like the replicator dynamics.
Proof. Straightforward.
B A simple case with imperfect signals
Suppose …rst movers receive, prior to making their decision whether or not to enter the contract, a signal s 2 R. The signal technology is the following: If player 2's true type is H, the signal is 1 + ", with " being normally distributed with mean zero and variance ¾ 2 . If player 2's true type is M, the signal is 0 + ", with " coming from the same normal distribution.
How will player 1 decide about whether to enter the contract? Nothing changes in case of p > a 1+a : She will always enter. (This follows from the fact that she even enters when she knows for sure that player 2 is of type M.) In case of p < a 1+a player 1 has to update her beliefs about the type of her partner by using Bayes' rule. And if and only if the probability for player 2 being of type is large enough, she will enter. Hence, there will be a critical value s such that player 1 enters if s¸s and stays out otherwise.
Given s and the signal technology one can now compute the probabilities with which the two di¤erent types are o¤ered contracts. And using these probabilities one can calculate the expected payo¤s of both types or, in a population model, the average payo¤ of both types.
Obviously, H-types will always get more contracts than M-types. (That signal s exceeds s is more likely for H-types.) On the other hand, M-types bene…t from pro…table breach.
Which of these two e¤ects is the stronger one critically depends on how noisy the signal is, i.e., on the variance ¾ 2 .
There are two boundary cases: (i) ¾ ! 0, the case of a perfect signal, where the …rst e¤ect is stronger than the second (and where trustworthiness is crowded in).
(ii) ¾ ! 1, the case without a signal where the second e¤ect is stronger (and trustworthiness is crowded out).
Obviously, one can now …nd a critical standard deviation, ¾, inducing identical expected monetary payo¤s for both types. If the standard deviation is above this level, M-types will earn more than H-types and the third result of Proposition 2 would be reversed. If the standard deviation is, however, below this level the original result is resurrected.
C Sample instructions
for random matching, medium probability, player 1 and the …rst phase of the experiment Welcome to this research project! You are participating in a study in which you have the opportunity to earn cash. The actual amount of cash you will earn depends on your choices and the choices of other persons. At the end of the study, the amount of cash earned will be added to your show-up fee and paid to you in cash.
What the study is about:
The study is on how people decide. How the study is conducted:
The study is conducted anonymously, without communication between the participants, and repeated 9 rounds. Participants are only identi…ed by a letter or a number called "code number".
Neither the other participants nor the researcher will ever know how you decided. You are randomly matched with another person after each round. You will never interact with the same person again.
You are person 1.
Start of the study You earn 150 cents with probability 0.5 (®) and 20 cents with probability 0.5 (¯), i.e. your expected earnings after a chance move are 85 cents.
The other person earns 120 cents with probability 0.5 (® ) and 250 cents with probability 0.5 (¯), i.e. his or her expected earnings after a chance move are 185 cents.
Payo¤ Table   Who B. Indicate your choice on the decision sheet marked "Round 1", put this decision sheet back into the envelope and put it into the box which we will pass around. Keep all other decision sheets.
Persons 2 are randomly allocated an envelope and asked to look at your decision and-if they get to make a choice-indicate their choice of either Y and Z on the decision sheet. Decision sheets will be put back into the envelope and into the box.
We collect all decision sheets and count how many people in this room chose A, B, Y, and Z, respectively, and inform all of you of the aggregate outcome of the …rst round. We then give you the envelope back. Please take the decision out. The information on the decision sheet is private. Please do not share it with anybody else.
Chance now decides whether ® or¯will be realized in this round. For this purpose we draw a card from a pile with 5 red and 5 black cards. Red implies ®, black implies¯.
We determine your earnings according to your choice and the choice of the other person after the study is over. Your earnings will be paid to you in cash.
End of round 1. Table 8 summarizes behavior for all sessions over time. 
D Data
Round
